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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

2.

WHETHER THE PRESIDENT MAY, ABSENT MEANINGFUL CONSULTATION WITH AND GENUINE APPROVAL
BY CONGRESS, ORDER UNITED STATES ARMED
FORCES TO MAKE WAR.
WHETHER NONJUSTICIABILITY DOCTRINES BAR A
FEDERAL COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FROM DECIDING THE ABOVE QUESTION.
INTEREST OF AMICI

The current situation in the Persian Gulf raises grave legal
questions of pressing concern to all Americans. Amici curiae, the
law professors named below, have lectured and published widely
on the subjects of constitutional law or the law of United States
foreign relations. This amicus memorandum sets forth their considered views on two constitutional questions raised by the cur257
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rent controversy. It speaks solely to these matters of
constitutional principle, not to the morality or political wisdom of
any executed or contemplated governmental action. Amici sign
this memorandum on their own behalf and not as representatives
of their respective schools. The affiliations and qualifications of
amici are as follows:
Bruce A. Ackerman is Sterling Professor of Law and Political
Science at Yale University and author, inter alia, of We The People
(forthcoming Harvard University Press).
Abram Chayes is Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law at
Harvard University, former Legal Adviser to the United States
Department of State, and author, inter alia, of The Cuban Missile
Crisis: International Crisis and the Role of Law, and International Legal
Process (co-author with T. Ehrlich and A. Lowenfeld).
Lori Fisler Damrosch is Professor of Law at Columbia University and author, inter alia, of Foreign States and the Constitution, 73
Va. L. Rev. 483 (1987), and of a forthcoming casebook on Foreign Affairs and the Constitution (co-author with L. Henkin).
John Hart Ely is Robert E. Paradise Professor of Law and former Dean of the Law School at Stanford University and author,
inter alia, of Democracy and Distrust; The American War in Indochina
(Parts I & II), 42 Stan. L. Rev. 877, 1092 (1990); and Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1379
(1988).
Erwin N. Griswold is former Dean and Langdell Professor of
Law at Harvard University and former Solicitor General of the
United States.
Gerald Gunther is William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law
at Stanford University and author, inter alia, of Constitutional Law
(11th ed.).
Louis Henkin is University Professor Emeritus and Special
Service Professor at Columbia University, formerly Chief Reporter of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, and author, inter alia, of Foreign Affairs and the Constitution; Constitutionalism, Democracy, and Foreign Affairs; a forthcoming
casebook on Foreign Affairs and the Constitution (co-author with
L. Damrosch); and Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 Yale
LJ. 597 (1976).
Harold Hongju Koh is Professor of Law at Yale University
and author, inter alia, of The National Security Constitution: Sharing
Power After the Iran-Contra Affair.
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Philip B. Kurland is William R. Kenan, Jr. Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago and author, inter alia,
of The Founders' Constitution (co-author with R. Lerner).
Laurence H. Tribe is RalphS. Tyler,Jr. Professor of Constitutional Law at Harvard University and author, inter alia, of American
Constitutional Law (2d ed.); Constitutional Choices; and On Reading the
Constitution (forthcoming Harvard University Press).
William W. Van Alstyne is the William & Thomas Perkins Professor of Law at Duke University and author, inter alia, of Congress,
the President, and the Power to Declare War: A Requiem for Vietnam, 121
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1972).
ARGUMENT
1.

THE PRESIDENT MAY NOT, ABSENT MEANINGFUL
CONSULTATION WITH AND GENUINE APPROVAL
BY CONGRESS, ORDER UNITED STATES
ARMED FORCES TO MAKE WAR.

Article I, § 8, d. 11 of the United States Constitution states
that "Congress shall have Power ... [t]o declare War." Although
Article II, § 2, d. 1 names the President "Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy," the President may not invoke that authority
to make war without consulting with and gaining the genuine approval of Congress.
The structure and history of our Constitution compel this
sharing of responsibility. Like other presidential powers, executive power to conduct military action remains subject to the
checks and balances vested by the Constitution in Congress and
the courts. "This system," in James Wilson's words, "will not
hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will not
be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress; for the important power of declaring
war is vested in the legislature at large .... " 2 The Debates in the
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 528
(J. Elliot ed. 1888). Nor, as Justice Black's opinion for the Court
suggested in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
587-88 (1952), did the Framers vest a general warmaking authority in the President by using the words "executive Power" in Article II, § 1, d. 1. 1 During the Constitutional Convention, the
I See also Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and President in the Making and Abrogation of
Treaties-The Original Intent of the Framers of the Constitution Historically Examined, 55 Wash.

L. Rev. 1, 30-46, 79-82, 87-91 (1979).
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Framers did rephrase Congress' power to "make" war as an authority to "declare war." 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of
1787, at 318-19 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1937). That rewording
served not to transfer unilateral warmaking authority to the President, however,· but only to clarify his constitutional latitude to
repel sudden attacks against the United States without a formal
declaration of war. 2
In his famous concurrence in Youngstown, Justice Jackson posited that:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right
plus all that Congress can delegate ....
2. When the President acts in the absence of either a
congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely
·upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of
twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain ....
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with
the expressed or implied will ofCongress, his power is at
its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of
Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from
acting upon the subject.
343 U.S. 579, 635-638 (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
This analysis "summarize[s] the pragmatic, flexible view of
differentiated gpvemmental power to which we are heir." 3 In the
present situation, Justice Jackson's reasoning requires a court to
determine whether
the· presidential conduct in question falls
..
'

'

2 See A. Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power: The Origins 32 (1976)
("nothing in the change signifies an intent to allow the President a general authority to
'make' war in the absence of a declaration"); L. Levy, Original Intent and the Framers' Constitution 37 (1988). This memorandum addresses only the President's power to make
war, not his authority to use force to repel sudden attacks upon United States territory
or armed forces.
3 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989). The full Court has repeatedly
endorsed Justice Jackson's reasoning in separation-of-powers cases. See, e.g., Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986); Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981) (Justice Jackson's concurrence "brings together as much combination of analysis and common sense as there is in this area");
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (in United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974), "the unanimous Court essentially embraced Mr. Justice Jackson's view, expressed in his concurrence in Youngstown ... ").
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within the exclusive scope of the President's Commander-inChief power. In analyzing this claim, the court should recall that
the power to decide for war falls within the scope of legislative,
not executive, authority. Any claim of presidential authority to
act unilaterally as Commander-in-Chief, "at once so conclusive
and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at
stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system." !d. at 638. If the President claims to act under delegated
authority, the court must carefully examine public expressions of
congressional will to determine whether those expressions manifest genuine approval for presidential action. 4
The Constitution specifies that Congress shall publicly manifest its approval for a determination to make war via a formal
declaration of war. U.S. Const. art. I,§ 8, d. 11. We do not read
that clause as rigidly stipulating the only political mechanism
whereby Congress may meaningfully manifest its understanding
and approval. 5 We do, however, understand the structure and
history of the Constitution to require that the President meaningfully consult with Congress and receive its affirmative authorization-not merely present it with faits accomplis-before engaging
in war. We further believe that Congress must manifest its genuine approval through formal action, not legislative silence, stray
remarks of individual Members, or collateral legislative activity
that the President or a court might construe to constitute "acquiescence" in executive acts.
In Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967), Justice Stewart,
joined by Justice Douglas, dissented from denial of certiorari to
4 This court should not avoid Youngstown's reasoning by invoking sweeping dicta
from United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). The Court has never
suggested-before, after, or in Curtiss-Wright itself-that the President's "very delicate,
plenary and exclusive power ... as the sole organ of the federal government in the field
of international relations," id. at 320, included a general power to make war. As Justice
Jackson later recognized, Curtiss-Wright "involved, not the question of the President's
power to act without congressional authority, but the question of his right to act under
and in accord with an Act of Congress." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 635-36 n.2 (1952) Uackson, J., concurring). Moreover, numerous commentators
have exposed deep flaws in Curtiss-Wright's reasoning. See, e.g., Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 Yale LJ. 467, 493 ( 1946); Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 Mich. L. Rev. I, 26-33 ( 1972);
Glennon, Two Views of Presidential Foreign Affairs Power: Little v. Barreme or Curtiss-Wright1,
13 Yalej. lnt'l L. 5, 12-17 (1988); LaFeber, The Constitution and United States Foreign Policy:
An Interpretation, 74 J. Am. Hist. 695, 710-714 (1987); Lofgren, United States v. CurtissWright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 Yale LJ. I (1973).
5 Cf U.S. Const. art. I,§ 8, cl. 18 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution ... all . . . Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States .... ").
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three draftees' petition requesting injunctive and declaratory relief against allegedly illegal U.S. military activity in Vietnam. justice Stewart identified the following "questions of great
magnitude" raised· by the petition:
I. Is the ·present United States military activity . . . a
"war" within the meaning of Article I, Section 8, Clause
11, of the Constitution?
II. If so, may the Executive constitutionally order the petitioners to participate in that military activity, when no
war has been declared by the Congress?
III. Of what relevance to Question II are the present
treaty obligations of the United States?
IV. Of what relevance to Question II is [any] joint Congressional . . . Resolution [passed with regard to such
activity]?
(a) Do present United States military operations
fall within the terms of the joint Resolution?
(b) If the Joint Resolution purports to give the
Chief ·Executive authority to commit United States
forces to armed conflict limited in scope only by his
own absolute discretion, is the Resolution a constitutionally impermissible delegation of all or part of
Congress' power to declare war?
!d. at 934-35.
Amici submit that the current situation in the Persian Gulf also
implicates these questions and that this court should analyze
those issues before it in accordance with the constitutional principles stated above.
2.

THE LEGAL QUESTIONS RAISED ABOVE ARE
JUSTICIABLE AND IN AN APPROPRIATE CASE,
A FEDERAL COURT MAY DECIDE THEM.

The parties before the court bear responsibility for addressing the justiciability of the specific legal claims raised here. Amici
urge the court, however, to view those specific claims against a
broad principle: that questions regarding the scope of Congress'
power to declare war and the President's power as Commanderin-Chief are not, by their nature, inherently unfit for judicial resolution. 6 In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211, 217 (1962), the
Supreme Court called it "error to suppose that every case or con6

Amici take no position on the plaintiffs' standing to bring their claims.
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troversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance," arguing that the nonjusticiability doctrine is "one of
'political questions,' not one of 'political cases.' " That statement
rested on a recognition that, since the beginning of the Republic,
federal judges have reviewed the legality of military seizures, retaliatory strikes, and covert actions ordered under claims of delegated and inherent presidential power to conduct warfare. 7
Those cases that have reviewed and sustained presidential orders
of military action plainly rebut any claims that such actions are
somehow immune from judicial scrutiny. 8
More recently, the Supreme Court has announced that
"[r]esolution oflitigation challenging the constitutional authority
of the one of the three branches cannot be evaded by courts because the issues have political implications .... " INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919,943 (1983). Questions ofinterpretation oftreaties,
executive agreements, and customary international law have long
been heldjusticiable. 9 Nor can a court evade interpretation of an
Act of Congress-whether the War Powers Resolution of 1973,
50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1982), or any subsequent joint resolution-simply because the legality of presidential warmaking may
be called into question. As the Court recently declared, "under
the Constitution, one of the Judiciary's characteristic roles is to
interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this responsibility merely
because our decision may have significant political overtones.''
japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230
(1986). Finally, in times of actual and threatened hostilities, the
courts bear a special responsibility to scrutinize government conduct that allegedly infringes individual rights. 10
Prudential factors do not invariably weigh against judicial res7 See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804); Brown v. United States, 12
U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) I (1801); Bas v. Tingy, 4
U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800); United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806). See
generally Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 Yale
LJ. 672, 701 (1972).
8 See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 666-71 (1862); Martin v. Molt, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 30 (1827). Cf United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304 (1936) (reviewing and sustaining presidential action on the merits, relying on authority delegated from Congress).
9 See, e.g., Sumitomo Shoji America v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) (construing
treaty); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (construing executive agreement);
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (construing customary international" law).
to See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). Even the
Supreme Court's thoroughly discredited decision in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944), reviewed on the merits the wartime governmental conduct challenged there.
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olution of warmaking questions. II If anything, meaningful judicial review is even more constitutionally necessary in the current
situation than in traditional domestic cases. · Through the
Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2, the Framers largely
removed the states as a political check against executive action in
foreign affairs. Precisely because federal judges enjoy life tenure
and salary independence, they have both the power and a special
obligation to say what the law is in warmaking cases, which invariably implicate controversial legal issues and affect private interests. Such cases raise "large and deeply troubling [substantive]
questions" and require "the resolution of serious preliminary issues of justiciability." Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934, 935
(1967) (Stewart, J., joined by Douglas, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari). This court bears a grave constitutional duty to decide these questions carefully and systematically, and only after
full briefing and oral argument.

II See, e.g., Redish,judicial Review and the "Political Question," 79 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1031,
1045-55 (1985); Tigar,Judicial Power, the "Political Question Doctrine," and Foreign Relations,
17 UCLA L. Rev. 1135 (1970).

